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Footnotes  
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 115 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
2. Id. at 110-11.
3. Id. at 109-11
4. Id. at 108-13. The parallel of Canon 3A(6) in the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct approved in 1990 is Canon 3B(9), which
states, “A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or
impending in any court, make any public comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness
or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially inter-
fere with a fair trial or hearing.” The parallel of Canon 3A(4) in
the 1990 Code is Canon 3B(7), which provides, “A judge shall not
initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications, or consider other communications made
to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pend-
ing or impending proceeding.”
5. Id. at 113.
6. Id. at 107.
7. Id. at 115 (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a)).
8. Id. at 112.
9. Id. at 115.
The disqualification of Judge Thomas Penfield Jacksonfrom the Microsoft case for his free-wheeling commentsto the news media1 has provided a sharp reminder of the
dangers of extrajudicial speech. 
In its biting opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia castigated Judge Jackson for giving media
interviews and public speeches in which he made remarkably
astringent remarks about Microsoft. Among his more colorful
comments, the judge mused that Bill Gates had Napoleonic
hubris and he likened the break-up of Microsoft to swatting a
recalcitrant mule with a two-by-four.2 Among his more poten-
tially prejudicial remarks were his speculation to reporters—
before his order splitting Microsoft—that ‘a break-up is
inevitable” and his post-trial comments disparaging the credi-
bility of trial witnesses.3
The court concluded that the judge’s remarks violated
Canon 3A(6) of the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires a judge to “avoid public comment on the merits of
pending and impending cases,” and its corollary, Canon 3A(4),
which prohibits ex parte communications about a case.4 The
court also determined that the judge violated Canon 2, which
requires a judge to ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all . . . activities.”5 Declaring that these “viola-
tions were deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant,”6 the
court ordered the judge’s disqualification pursuant to a federal
statute that requires disqualification of a judge when a reason-
able observer would question his or her impartiality.7
As the court pointed out, the “Microsoft case was ‘pending’
during every one of the District Judge’s meetings with
reporters; the case is ‘pending’ now; and even after our deci-
sion issues, it will remain pending for some time.” The court
explained that the judge “breached his ethical duty under
Canon 3A(6) each time he spoke to a reporter about the mer-
its of the case.”8
The court’s ruling was appropriate because any public com-
ment by a judge about the facts, applicable law, or merits of a
case that is sub judice in his court or any comment concerning
the parties or their attorneys may raise grave doubts about the
judge’s objectivity and his willingness to reserve judgment
until the close of the proceeding. Moreover, any such com-
ments in a jury trial might unduly sway the jury.
The need to avoid bias and the appearance of bias also
seems to explain why the canon embraces public comments
concerning proceedings in any court, rather than merely pro-
ceedings in the judge’s own court. This appears to guard
against the danger that a judge would feel pressured or appear
to feel pressured by the comments of his peers on other
benches or that a jury would accord deference to an opinion
expressed by another judge. The rule against comments by
judges who are not involved in a proceeding likewise helps to
ensure the integrity of the judicial process itself since a judicial
proceeding should be a self-contained entity that remains
immune from outside influences, even if such influences are
not specifically prejudicial. 
Paradoxically, the apparent increase in inappropriate extra-
judicial remarks by judges reflects positive developments—the
increased and improved media attention to legal issues in
response to growing public sophistication about legal issues.
For example, first-year students that I have taught during
recent years are better informed about legal concepts and ter-
minology than were the students that I first taught thirteen
years ago.
Although the growing public fascination with legal issues
may reflect society’s growing litigiousness, it also demonstrates
a widespread desire to become better informed about issues
that have a pervasive impact on everyday life. Unfortunately,
this healthy public appetite for information about the law has
stimulated in some judges an undue hunger for publicity. Such
craving for media attention debases the dignity of the judiciary
and erodes the public confidence in judicial objectivity which
is a predicate for the rule of law. As the court of appeals
observed in the Microsoft case, judges “who covet publicity, or
convey the appearance that they do, lead any objective
observer to wonder whether their judgments are being influ-
enced by the prospect of favorable coverage in the media.”9
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10. For discussions of the constitutional aspects of regulation of judi-
cial speech, see Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and
the First Amendment, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181 (1986); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren’s Call? Judges and Free Speech While
Cases Are Pending, 28 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 831 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977); In
re Kaiser, 111 Wash. 2d 275, 759 P.2d 392 (1988); In re Rome, 218
Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975).
12. For a recent dialogue about this issue, see Monroe H. Freedman,
Free Speech for Judges: A Commentary on Lubet et al. v. Posner,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 2001, at 4-5; Steven Lubet, Free Speech and
Neutrality: A Reply to Professor Freedman, COURT REVIEW, Winter
2001, at 6-7.
13. See William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries
of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 609-11 (1989).
14. Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984).
15. Id. at 607-08, 610.
16. Some 50% of the 82 judges in the Seventh Circuit who responded
to a 1989 survey believed that there were “civility problems”
between judges; 47% perceived no problem, and 3% provided no
response. See Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the
Seventh Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 431 (1992).
17. See William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of
Proper Criticism by Judges of Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957-73
(1999).
18. See Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting
Indeterminacy with One Bold Thought, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 113, 115
(1990)(arguing that any dissent might harm a court’s legitimacy).
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATIONS
Judges and journalists who complain that ethical canons
unduly restrict judicial speech are fond of correctly pointing
out that judges are citizens, too, and that judges—like other
citizens—enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.10 Like
other citizens, however, a judge does not enjoy unlimited
rights to free speech.11 While restrictions on judicial speech
are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, courts long
have recognized that judges may be disciplined for speech that
would not warrant sanctions against other citizens inasmuch
as there is a compelling interest in protecting public confi-
dence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Public comments by
judges about the facts, applicable law, or merits of a case or any
comment about the parties could easily raise doubts about the
judge’s objectivity and his or her willingness to reserve judg-
ment until the close of the proceedings. The judge’s right to
free speech in these circumstances must therefore be tempered
by the compelling public interest in protecting the integrity of
the judicial process and public confidence in the judiciary. 12
COMMENTS ABOUT A JUDGE’S OWN DECISIONS
In addition to following the Canon’s prohibition on com-
ments about pending and impending cases, a judge also should
generally refrain from public comment about his own deci-
sions. As an official pronouncement, a judicial decision is a
self-contained entity that must speak for itself. Any public
comment by the judge about the decision detracts from its
integrity. A judge therefore should not gild his judicial lily.
Such comments may distort the legal process by encouraging
lawyers and even courts to interpret the decision in the context
of the judge’s remarks. In contrast to statutes, which may be
interpreted with reference to legislative history, a judicial deci-
sion must be its own exponent.13
It may be appropriate and even wise, however, for a judge
to discuss his opinion with the news media in off-the-record
sessions in order to help facilitate more intelligent and
informed news coverage. As the Supreme Court of Alabama
has observed, “Often there is no one, other than the judge,
who is in a position to give a detailed and impartial explana-
tion of the case to the news media.”14
Judges are most likely to feel tempted to comment upon or
explain their decisions when those decisions encounter wide-
spread criticism. In accordance with the need to protect the
integrity of the decision, a
judge should ordinarily offer
no apology for what she has
done. If the criticism is scur-
rilous, the criticism does not
deserve the dignity of a judi-
cial reply.  If the criticism is
temperate and expresses a rea-
sonable point of view, the
judge could not contribute
anything of value beyond what
his opinion already says; the
opinion itself therefore pro-
vides the most effective retort
to public criticism. Moreover,
a host of lawyers, journalists,
public officials, and academics are available to come to the
judge’s defense. In rare instances, however, a public comment
by a judge may help to mute criticism of the judiciary more
effectively than a comment by anyone else. For example, it may
have been appropriate for several members of the Warren Court
to publicly defend the Court during the 1960s after the Court’s
decisions on such controversial issues as school desegregation,
subversion, school prayer, and criminal procedure had disaf-
fected substantial portions of the public.15
CRITICISM OF FELLOW JUDGES
Judges should attempt to stem the growing trend toward
direct criticism of other judges.16 Such criticism is ill-advised
because it tends to impugn public confidence in the quality
and objectivity of justice by calling undue attention to the
political aspects of the judicial process.17 In particular, judges
should refrain from making bilious comments about other
judges in their opinions, concurrences, and dissents since such
comments are generally superfluous, adding little or nothing
to the usefulness of the opinion. Biting dissents may erode the
legitimacy of the decision,18 while majority decisions that sting
dissenters may create contentiousness and verbosity that
impede the court’s ability to provide clear guidance to lower
courts, law enforcement agencies, legislators, and citizens. 
Incivility among judges also may exacerbate incivility
among lawyers. As U.S. District Court Judge Stanley Sporkin
has observed, “Civility starts at home. How can courts expect
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1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328 at *21-*22 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 1998).
20. See Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the
Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U.L. REV. 583, 644 (1994).
21. See e.g., Standards of Professional Conduct, W. VA. LAWYER, Jan.
1997, at 12; Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441, 452 (7th Cir. 1992); Iowa
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Judicial System, published at President’s Message, R.I. BAR J., May
1996, at 10.
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Other Federal Judges before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers,
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Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984).
24. See Delay in Approving Judicial Nominees Angers Rehnquist, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at 40.
25. See M.J. PUSEY, 2 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 754-57 (1951).
lawyers appearing before
them to be more civil
when Article III judges are
not civil to one another?
. . . We who try to dis-
charge our judicial
responsibilities in a con-
scientious and just man-
ner . . . should not be the
victim of vicious personal
attacks from other
judges.”19
Judges should confine
their criticism of the abili-
ties or character of fellow
judges to private judicial
disciplinary channels, for
public aspersions bring both the target of the criticism and the
critic into disrepute and tend to undermine faith in the judicial
system. Any private or public remarks by a judge about a fel-
low judge should be made with the objectivity, balance, and
civility that is worthy of the temperament that is expected of a
judge.20 Although judicial civility codes recently adopted by
various states may encourage more civility among judges,21
judges generally should not need written codes to reinforce
elementary decorum.
COMMENTS ABOUT POLITICAL ISSUES
Judges should be particularly wary about making any com-
ment concerning political issues. Judges who take public
stands on partisan questions erode the independence and
integrity of the judiciary by blurring the line between the
courts and politics. Such statements also create the danger of
prejudice since a judge may later face in court an issue about
which he has spoken. Although she can recuse, “[a] judge is
paid to be a judge, not paid to do things which disqualify him
from acting as a judge.”22
COMMENTS ABOUT THE JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Despite the various formal and prudential restrictions on
extrajudicial speech, there are many circumstances under
which extrajudicial speech is highly desirable. Canon 3B(9)
explicitly provides that the rule against comment on a pending
or impending case “does not prohibit judges from making pub-
lic statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.”
Extrajudicial discussion by judges about issues concerning the
legal system are particularly appropriate, provided that such
comments are well reasoned and are not expressed in a man-
ner that detracts from the dignity of the court. Indeed, one
organization of state trial judges has urged judges to “explain
legal terms, and concepts, procedures, and the issues involved
in [a] case so as to permit the news representatives to cover the
case more intelligently.”23 By helping to facilitate more intelli-
gent news coverage, judges can serve an important role in edu-
cating the public about the judicial process and can thereby
enhance public respect for the judiciary and the judicial sys-
tem.
Judges likewise have a duty to comment on issues of judi-
cial administration about which they have unique knowledge.
It is particularly appropriate for judges to speak out about pro-
posed legislation or other actions by coordinate branches of
government that would affect their own court. For example, it
was proper for Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in 1997 to
express anxiety about the growing number of judicial vacan-
cies caused by the friction between the Clinton Administration
and the Senate Judiciary Committee.24 Indeed, judges have a
virtual duty to make such communications to the extent that
they are in a special or unique position to inform legislators or
the general public about the benefits or dangers of various
forms of legislation. During the controversy over President
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in 1937, for example, Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes properly rebutted Roosevelt’s
contention that the Court needed more justices because the
Court was overworked, for no one was better qualified to
speak to this question than was Hughes.25 When a judge can-
not bring anything other than his own prestige to a contro-
versy over judicial administration, however, the propriety of
comments is more troublesome. 
Judges have made many significant improvements to the
law by teaching, publishing, and serving as members of pro-
fessional organizations. Recognizing the importance of such
contributions, Canon 4(B) provides that “[a] judge may speak,
write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-judicial
activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administra-
tion of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the require-
ments of this Code.” As the commentary to this Canon aptly
notes, “As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the
law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administra-
tion of justice.”  
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26. Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984) (affirming the
Court of the Judiciary’s finding that the judge had violated Canon
3A(6) by discussing with a local newspaper editor a proceeding
for constructive contempt that was pending in the judge’s court)
PRACTICAL POINTERS FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH
In many instances, judges may walk a very fine line between
useful comments about the judicial system and remarks about
issues that may come before the judge or create the appearance
that the judge is unduly “political.” The danger is not so great
when a judge publishes her thoughts, since the publication
process enables the judge to take the time and effort to ensure
that he presents his views in a careful and nonprejudicial man-
ner. Similarly, comments made by judges in the relatively clois-
tered contexts of teaching, public addresses, and service in
professional organizations are not likely to cause problems if
the judge observes elementary caution to avoid remarks that
detract from judicial dignity or create the appearance of bias.
The greatest risk occurs in contacts with the news media.
Even a discrete and self-disciplined judge may slip across this
line when he enters into a conversation with the press about a
case. Another danger is the threat of misquotation. The
Supreme Court of Alabama noted that “the risk of being mis-
quoted, albeit honestly, may enter into the consideration and
tilt the balance in favor of ‘no comment.’”26 Since a judge’s
interviews with the news media can serve the useful purpose
of helping to educate the public about the law, however, judges
need to consider ways to talk with the media in a manner that
is consistent with judicial decorum.
This conflict between the goal of intelligent media coverage
and judicial discretion and decorum may be resolved in part by
off-the-record comments. Speaking off-the-record helps to
facilitate media understanding of the judge’s work and can
help to prevent misunderstandings that could confuse the pub-
lic or even diminish public respect for the court. At the same
time, such comments help to avoid the danger of an appear-
ance of bias or self-promotion that may occur when a judge
speaks for attribution. Although off-the-record comments dur-
ing the pendency of the proceeding probably would constitute
“public comment” within the definition of Canon 3B(9),
explanations of procedures, history, or terminology would not
run afoul of the Canon because they would not be directed to
the merits of a case. Neither would such comments be likely to
interfere with the fairness of the trial or hearing, in violation of
Canon 3B(9). After the conclusion of a case, a judge’s off-the-
record comments explaining a judicial decision would not add
or detract from the decision insofar as there would be no pub-
lic record of her comments.
A judge would be prudent to begin every interview off-the-
record in order to ensure that nothing that he says can be
quoted without permission and that all of his remarks are
immunized from quotation if he finds himself talking too
freely. It is essential that the judge inform the reporter in
advance that his remarks will be off-the-record since journalis-
tic custom generally does not respect retrospective requests for
anonymity, even if they are made immediately after the inter-
viewee has spoken.
This off-the-record format also may enable the judge to
speak more coherently, without having to break up her
remarks by going on and off
the record or engaging in
self-censorship that might
produce omissions or ellipti-
cal remarks that would
detract from the reporter’s
comprehension of what the
judge says. Toward the close
of the interview, the judge
could select remarks that she
wanted to place on the
record.
Of course, a judge needs
to be circumspect even when
speaking off the record, and even here should avoid comments
about the merits of pending or impending cases or the person-
alities of attorneys and their clients. Not only is such silence is
commanded by the Canons, but it will avoid embarrassment if
the reporter does not honor his promise to refrain from quot-
ing the judge because there is always the danger that a reporter
will unprofessionally attribute any off-the-record remarks to
the judge. Such derelictions, however, are relatively rare, and
they will be particularly unlikely if the judge places all of his
remarks off-the-record except for those that he specifically
authorizes the reporter to quote. Since a judge can avoid care-
less or unscrupulous reporters only by avoiding the news
media altogether, most judges are likely to find that the bene-
fits of talking with the news media about subjects permitted by
the Canons will outweigh the danger that the reporter will
transgress the line between what is on and off the record.
A judge also would be wise to begin every media interview
by declaring that he refuses to comment on the merits of any
pending case, any case that might come before him, or any case
in which he has participated in the past. The judge might
soften this declaration by explaining that the Canons prevent
such comment. The judge likewise should make clear that he
is willing to comment only about such matters as legal terms,
concepts, and procedures.
In talking with the news media, judges also need to take
care to consider the background of the reporter and the char-
acter of the media. A judge who speaks with a reporter for a
legal newspaper or a reporter who specializes in legal affairs for
a major newspaper obviously can address legal issues in a more
sophisticated manner than if she speaks with a reporter who is
unfamiliar with the law. When speaking with a reporter who is
not trained in the law, the judge needs to take great patience in
explaining legal terminology or issues and should not make
the mistake of assuming the reporter knows anything about
the law. 
SUMMARY
Extrajudicial speech can produce great public benefit and
also can cause tremendous harm. Temperate extrajudicial
speech that avoids discussion of pending cases or controversial
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political issues can help to enhance public respect for courts
and understanding of judicial issues. As the disqualification of
Judge Jackson demonstrates, however, indiscrete comments
may create the appearance of bias or encourage the perception
that judges are excessively emotional or political in their adju-
dication of cases. Accordingly, judges need to exercise a high
level of circumspection in making comments off the bench
about judicial issues. A judge generally should refrain from
making comments unless he has carefully weighed both the
potential benefits and risks and has concluded that the former
significantly outweigh the latter. Although sanctions may be
imposed for grossly inappropriate comments, it is impossible
for judicial ethics commissions to monitor the myriad extraju-
dicial comments of tens of thousands of judges or to establish
standards that would apply to all situations. Most questions
about the propriety of extrajudicial comments therefore must
be resolved through the sound discretion and common sense
of judges themselves.
William G. Ross, visiting professor at Notre
Dame Law School during 2001-02, is a profes-
sor at the Cumberland School of Law of
Samford University. He has published numerous
articles about the professional responsibilities of
judges and lawyers and his books include The
Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based
Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic
Press, 1996). A former news reporter, Ross is a graduate of
Stanford University and Harvard Law School.
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